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et al.: Right to Counsel
RIGHT TO COUNSEL

N.Y CosSr. art. L § 6.
In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be
allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in
civil actions ....
U.S. CONST. amend V:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have Assistance of Counselfor his defence.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Taylor
(printed Sept. 19, 1996)
Defendant, Robert Taylor, was indicted on one count of
murder in the first degree and three counts of murder in the second
degree. 2 Defendant brought this motion contending that the court is
obligated to provide him with the assistance of co-counsel upon his
request, as guaranteed pursuant to Section 35-b of the Judiciary
6
5
Law 3 as well as the Federal 4 and New York State Constitutions.

1. N.Y. L.J., Sept. 19, 1996, at 26.

2. Id.
3. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35-b (2) (McKinney 1996). This provision states in
pertinent part:

The appointment of counsel shall be made by the trial court if made
prior to the entry of judgment including a sentence of death by the court
of appeals .

. .

. With respect to counsel at trial and at a separate

sentencing proceeding, the court shall appoint two attorneys, one to be
designated as "lead" counsel and the other to be designated as
"associate" counsel ....

Id.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . .
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Id.
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The County Court, Suffolk County, granted the defendant's motion
and ordered the trial court to appoint additional counsel as
7
provided for by the Judiciary Law.
Robert Taylor was arraigned on the indictment for one count of
First Degree Murder and three counts of Murder in the Third
Degree. 8
Mr. Taylor was represented by counsel at the
arraignment, but maintained that the trial court was required to
appoint co-counsel upon his request. 9 The Suffolk County District
Attorney and New York State Attorney General opposed the
motion and argued that there is no statutorily granted entitlement to
co-counsel when the defendant has already retained an attorney for
10
his defense.
The court began its analysis by stating that it is the right of all
defendants to be represented by an attorney of their choice as
guaranteed by both the United States Constitution and the New
York State Constitution. I I In deciding the defendant's federal
constitutional claim, the court stated a defendant's decision in
choosing an attorney to conduct his defense is to be respected and
"that choice should not unnecessarily be obstructed by the
court." 12 In Gideon v. Wainwright,13 the Supreme Court was
5. N.Y. CONST. art. I. § 6. This provision provides in pertinent part:
"In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to
appear and defend in person and with counsel . . . ." Id.
6. Taylor. N.Y. L.J., Sept. 19, 1996, at 26.
7. Id.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 239 F. Supp. 851, 855
(S.D.N.Y.) (holding that the right of a defendant to conduct his own defense

or obtain counsel of his own choosing are fundamental rights that must be
protected by the trial judge), aff'd, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965); People v.
Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307, 312, 342 N.E.2d 550, 553, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769, 774
(1975) (holding that the defendant's choice of counsel should not be lightly
interfered with by the court); People v. McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 480, 483, 53
N.E.2d 356, 357 (1944) (holding that a defendant's constitutional right to

obtain counsel is denied where the defendant is denied reasonable time and
opportunity to obtain counsel of his own choice).
12. United States v. Sheiner, 410 F.2d 337, 342 (2d Cir. 1969).
Appellant was convicted of sale and possession of fraudulent pennies and

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss3/32

2

1997]

et al.: Right to Counsel
RIGHT TO COUNSEL

confronted with the issue of whether an indigent defendant in state
court has a constitutional right to have counsel appointed to him. 14
In Gideon, the petitioner appeared before a Florida court on a
felony charge and requested that counsel be appointed for him. 15
That court denied his request and petitioner proceeded to conduct
his own defense. 16 Petitioner was convicted of a felony under
Florida law, was sentenced to five years in prison and appealed to
the Supreme Court of the United States, contending that the trial
court's refusal to appoint counsel denied him his constitutional
rights. 17 The United States Supreme Court held that an indigent
defendant who is unable to be represented by an attorney of his or
her own choosing must have a competent attorney appointed by the
court at the state's expense. 1 8 However, an indigent defendant

does not have an unequivocal

right to choose the assigned

counsel. 19 The Gideon Court overruled the rule established in Betts
fraudulent use of the wire and mail service in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341,
1343. Id. at 338. Appellant appealed his conviction arguing that he was unable
to enjoy effective assistance of counsel. Id. The Second Circuit held that
appellant was clearly informed of a potential for a prejudice and he freely
continued to assent to his attorney's joint representation of his co-defendant.
Id. at 342.
13. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
14. Id. at 344.
15. Id. at 336-37.
16. Id.
17. Id.

18. Id. at 343. The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to
assistance of counsel was extended to state courts by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 340. The Court stated:
[W]e [must] restore constitutional principals established to achieve a fair
system of justice . . . . [l]n our adversary system of criminal justice.
any person who is haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer.
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This
seems to be an obvious truth.
Id. at 344.
19. See People v. Sawyer, 57 N.Y.2d 12, 18, 438 N.E.2d 1133, 1136,
453 N.Y.S.2d 418, 421 (1982) (holding that the right to assigned counsel is not
equated with the right to choice of assigned counsel absent a showing, for
example, of a conflict of interest or professional incompetence); People v.
Rodriguez, 98 A.D.2d 961, 962-63, 470 N.Y.S.2d 64, 66-67 (1983) (holding
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v. Brady,20 which held that a refusal to appoint counsel for a
defendant charged with a felony did not necessarily violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 1 The Gideon
Court extended the constitutional right to counsel guaranteed by
22
the Sixth Amendment to the states.

that a court may allow participation by a defendant when it appears that the
defendant's waiver was competent, intelligent and voluntary).
20. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). In Betts, petitioner was indicted for robbery in
Maryland and was unable to afford counsel to appear at his arraignment. Id. at
457. The Maryland court refused to appoint counsel for Betts as it was not
their policy to appoint counsel for indigent defendants in robbery cases. Id.
Betts waived his right to a jury trial and conducted his own defense. Id. Betts
was subsequently found guilty and sentenced to prison. Id. Betts filed a writ of
habeas corpus to the Court of Appeals of Maryland which granted but his relief
was denied. Id. Petitioner applied to the United States Supreme Court for
certiorari alleging that he was deprived of his Due Process rights guaranteed
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Court stated:
[I]n the great majority of the States, it has been the considered judgment
of the people, their representatives and their courts that appointment of
counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial .... In light

of this evidence, we are unable to say that the concept of due process
incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the States,
whatever may be their own views, to furnish counsel in every such case.
Every court has power, if it deems proper, to appoint counsel where
that course seems to be required in the interest of fairness.
Id. at 471-72.
21. Id. at 473. The Court went on to state:
The Sixth Amendment of the national Constitution applies only to trials
in federal courts.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not incorporate, as such, the specific guarantees found
in the Sixth Amendment, although a denial by a state of rights or
privileges specifically embodied in that and others of the first eight
amendments may, in certain circumstances, or in connection with other
elements, operate, in any given case, to deprive a litigant of due process
of law in violation of the Fourteenth [Amendment].
Id. at 461-62.
22. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340. The Court rejected the historical data
compiled by the Betts Court which determined that the right to counsel is "not
a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial." Id. The Court pointed out that the
appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant is a fundamental right and
therefore "the Fourteenth Amendment requires the appointment of counsel in a
state court, just as the Sixth Amendment requires in a federal court." Id.
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In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon,
New York State adopted legislation entitling a defendant to be
monetarily reimbursed for private counsel fees in a criminal case. 23
After the passage of the Death Penalty Legislation of 1995, the
State Legislature enacted section 35-b of the Judiciary Law which
provides that a defendant, faced with the possibility of a death
penalty conviction, who is financially unable to obtain adequate
representation, shall be entitled to the appointment of counsel by
the trial court. 24 Problems arise because there is no clear
definition in the statute as to the meaning of "adequate
representation."
New York State courts have consistently expanded the
meaning of "adequate representation" in a capital murder case to
include two attorneys. 2 5 However, in this case, the People urged
the court to reconsider that expansion and carve out an exception
where a defendant has obtained one attorney with sufficient
funds.26 Therefore, the People argued that this defendant should
27
not be entitled to a court appointed co-counsel.
The Taylor Court investigated the legislative history behind
the law and determined that both public policy and legislative
intent required that an indigent defendant be afforded at least two

23. N.Y. COUNTY LAw § 722-b (McKinney 1991). This provision states in
pertinent part: "Where a defendant is charged with a crime which may be
punishable by death compensation shall not exceed two thousand four hundred
dollars where one counsel has been assigned, and shall not exceed three
thousand two hundred dollars where two or more counsel have been assigned."
Id.
24. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35-b (1) (McKinney Supp. 1996). This section
provides in pertinent part: "[I]n every criminal action in which a defendant is
charged with murder in the first degree ... the court shall determine whether
the defendant is or has become financially unable to obtain adequate
representation." Id.
25. Taylor, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 19, 1996, at 26. The court stated that "the

statute itself fixes the minimum number of

attorneys needed to provide

'adequate representation' at two." Id.
26. Id. (explaining that "[s]hould the court adopt the People's position of
strict interpretation there would be a clear conflict between the statute and the
defendant's constitutional right to any attorney of his own choosing").
27. Id.
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for "adequate representation" in a capital case. 28
in a case where a defendant has the financial ability to
one attorney, that defendant is deemed as lacking
representation." 29
The only remedy left to that
defendant is "either to surrender his constitutional right to be
represented by an attorney of his choosing or proceed to trial
30
without 'adequate representation.'
The court proceeded to determine whether the word "shall"
as used in Judiciary Law section 35-b should be read as merely
directory rather than mandatory. 3 1 Focusing on the legislative
intent behind the statute, the court determined that "shall" was to
be construed as directory, thus allowing the court, in its discretion,
to appoint one of the two of defendant's attorneys. 32 In this case,
the State of New York would not be burdened with the expense of
paying for the lead counsel's attorneys fees. 33 The County Court,
Suffolk County, granted the defendant's motion directing the court
to appoint adequate co-counsel in accordance with the provisions
of the Judiciary Law and the Federal and New York State
34
Constitution.
In conclusion, both the Federal and New York State
Constitutional protections for assistance of counsel demand that a
defendant be entitled to a court-appointed attorney in criminal
cases.
This constitutional right of adequate representation,
however, is not unrestricted. However. in New York, where a
defendant has already retained counsel in a capital case, the court
will be allowed to appoint co-counsel upon request. However, an
indigent defendant does not have the unrestricted right to choose
attorneys
However,
hire only
"adequate

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.

31. Id. ("The fact that a statute is framed in mandatory words such as
'shall' or 'must' is of slight, if any, importance on the question whether the act
is mandatory or directory").
32. Id. ("In this manner, the defendant receives the statutory 'adequate
representation'; the statute itself is not in conflict with the defendant's
constitutional right and the State is not burdened with the expense of 'lead
counsel. "').
33. Id.
34. Id.
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the assigned counsel. Under the Federal Constitution. the indigent
defendant is entitled to a court appointed attorney who must
provide his client with "adequate representation" in death penalty
cases. In contrast, the New York State Court of Appeals has
expanded the notion of "adequate representation" in capital cases
to the appointment by the court of two attorneys pursuant to
section 35-b of the Judiciary Law.
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